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Introduction
Much of what happens today in the South Caucasus 
resembles the turmoil of the pre-Soviet era, especially the 
period between the two world wars. As was the case then, 
Armenia, Azerbaijan, and Georgia are currently facing 
a daunting task: finding a way to safeguard their state 
sovereignty and their national security. Because of its 
unique geostrategic position, the region is of crucial sig-
nificance for the evolution of the 21st-century world order. 
While competition for energy resources has always been 
a highly geopolitical issue, the rivalry over control and 
influence in the South Caucasus has taken on ideological 
connotations, and the region has acquired even greater 
strategic importance to Russia and the European Union. 
The nations of the South Caucasus today are confront-
ed with a momentous choice: whether to repeat the histo-
ry of the early 1920s, when the Soviet Union was created, 
or to repeat the history of the late 1940s, when the Mar-
shall Plan was proposed. It should hardly be surprising to 
see the return of broader geopolitical concerns, and these 
raise interesting yet sensitive questions: Will the current 
and future circumstances of competition resemble those 
of 1917–20 or those of 1947–49? How has the content of 
that competition changed? Can Russia, the EU, and the 
South Caucasus find a way to cooperate internationally in 
ventures that unite them in the reconstruction of greater 
Europe, or will they fail to meet that challenge? This text 
analyzes the complex nature of the policies of Russia and 
the EU toward the neighborhood they share and exam-
ines possible ways in which the EU, Russia, Armenia, 
Azerbaijan, and Georgia could devise new approaches for 
mutually beneficial cooperation based on recognizing the 
interests of all parties involved.
Regional Realities of the Neighborhood Rus-
sia Shares with the EU 
The South Caucasus became a region of direct con-
cern to the EU’s security strategy with the two waves 
of eastern EU enlargement that took place in 2004 and 
2007, with the expansion of the European Neighborhood 
Policy (ENP), and with the Eastern Partnership program 
launched in 2009. During this period, the EU opened a 
new chapter with its ambitious plan to broaden coopera-
tion with its Eastern neighbors. It offered them privileged 
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relationships based on mutual commitment to common 
values. While assuming a greater regional role through 
Action Plans and Association Agreements, the EU sought 
to persuade the post-Soviet leaders of these countries to 
adopt reform measures that would contribute to fostering 
stability and security. As a result, the “expansive logic” of 
EU integration geared toward acquiring reliable part-
ners has produced the need to promote European norms 
and values beyond the EU’s political borders.1 In doing 
so, Brussels did not promise eventual EU membership to 
its neighbors in the South Caucasus but rather sought to 
make the region more predictable and controllable – and 
to create a secure geopolitical buffer between itself and 
Russia.
In all this, however, there is no small potential for 
tension with Moscow, which has accused Brussels of try-
ing to carve out a new sphere of influence in its Eastern 
neighborhood. On several occasions Russia has voiced 
concerns over the Eastern Partnership, describing it as 
another attempt to extend the EU’s power in its quest 
for energy resources. The South Caucasus has therefore 
turned into a site of clashing interests and power plays. 
Moscow strongly demonstrates its geopolitical vigor and 
frequently uses rigid methods to safeguard Russian na-
tional interests. Given the absence of a political solution 
to the protracted tension, Russia is bound in the coming 
years to remain actively involved in the region, which it 
very definitely regards as part of its own privileged sphere 
of influence.
Conversely, the overall context of EU-Russian relations 
strongly affects the foreign policy strategies of Armenia, 
Azerbaijan, and Georgia. Even as the European Union 
and the United States make every effort to prevent Russia 
from rebuilding the territory of the Commonwealth of 
Independent States (CIS) with new content, the entire 
region is turning into a staging ground for maneuvering 
among the great powers, “color revolutions,” secessionist 
movements, and bloody civil wars. Brussels views demo-
cratic change as a crucial means of establishing lasting 
peace and stability on its new borders, whereas Moscow 
perceives the Western promotion of democracy as a real 
threat to Russia’s leverage over the post-Soviet realm – 
as well as to Russian domestic policy. It is therefore no 
surprise that the EU’s extension of power for security pur-
poses has increasingly met with Russian countermeasures.
Different Visions for Reshaping the Region
The South Caucasus has been an area of East-West com-
petition for over twenty years, a fact that – in the absence 
of greater Western assertiveness – puts the whole region 
at risk of confrontation. Russia and the EU have their 
own often contradictory approaches and interests in the 
region. Increasingly suspicious of the Western presence 
in the Caspian basin, Russia has begun to actively resist 
what it perceives as the EU’s encroachments. From a 
geopolitical standpoint, Russian-EU competition is most 
likely a real contest between opposing value systems 
and ideologies. Integration policies in both the EU and 
Russia are built on the view that internal security chal-
lenges originate outside their borders. In this way, Russia 
generally regards closer regional integration with the EU 
as a geopolitical loss, while the EU views growing rap-
prochement with Russia as an attempt to restrain its own 
regional leverage.
Because the EU and the Eurasian Union are in direct 
competition with each other, Brussels and Moscow are 
locked into a struggle over who is most capable of at-
tracting the partner countries and under what terms 
and conditions. Given the impact of unresolved conflicts 
(especially Nagorno-Karabakh) on the South Caucasus’s 
future development, Moscow could exploit internal fault 
lines to serve as a major arbitrator in the peace process 
and pursue its objectives through military tactics. As a 
consequence, Russia’s geopolitical activism challenges 
the EU’s integration policies and creates dividing lines 
that could have broader geostrategic implications for 
Western democracies.
The EU for its part talks frequently about the energy 
market but increasingly thinks in terms of geopolitics. By 
doing so, the EU and the US unwittingly help President 
Putin fulfill his CIS strategy. Brussels and Washington 
have not coordinated with each other to craft achievable 
policy goals, while Moscow moves closer to creating its 
own Eurasian security alliance to compete with the EU 
and NATO. This complex reality involves two compet-
ing visions for reshaping the region, which prolongs the 
cycles of instability but does nothing to resolve regional 
security problems.
Realpolitik, Russian-Style
Internationally, the Kremlin follows a geopolitical 
philosophy: that the EU accept Russian-style realpolitik 
and respect the rules of the game set by Moscow for the 
post-Soviet realm. In order to reemerge as a great power, 
Russia is concentrating on expanding strategic ties with 
its CIS neighbors. The South Caucasus is hence a region 
of critical national interest to Russia, which cannot simply 
shirk engagement there. As the Russian-Georgian war 
of August 2008 vividly illustrated, and as the Nagorno-
Karabakh peace process shows today, Russian influence is 
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growing stronger. The Kremlin insists that the countries 
in its “near abroad” not only retain but also strengthen 
their security arrangements with Moscow. Russia has 
taken what the British researcher Roy Allison calls a 
“protective integration” approach toward the post-Soviet 
Eurasian countries.2 In addition to promoting strategic 
initiatives within the format of the Collective Security 
Treaty Organization and the Shanghai Cooperation Or-
ganization, Putin’s Eurasian Union project is the newest 
well-thought-out plan and a current passionate manifes-
tation of the logic of protective integration.
The very fact that Western policies are backing 
Western economic goals for the Caspian Sea has already 
brought the EU into conflict with Russia’s national inter-
est. The issues of pipeline routes, foreign policy tradeoffs, 
and regional security tend to involve intense competition 
over who receives how much gas. Besides, Moscow clearly 
continues to influence the South Caucasus nations in 
various, subtle ways so as to orchestrate a conflict settle-
ment scenario that will not only serve Russian strategic 
interests but also in the end gratify Armenia, Azerbaijan, 
and Georgia. Such a regional perspective best illustrates 
Russia’s broad interests, of which Putin’s Eurasian Union 
is but one important part. Modernizing itself and dem-
onstrating strong ability for long-term stability are the 
prerequisites for Russia’s continued success in the 21st 
century. It remains to be seen however whether Russia’s 
domestic reforms will successfully be implemented and to 
what extent they can boost the Eurasian Union’s attrac-
tiveness for the countries of South Caucasus. This is why 
the next few years will prove decisive in the struggle to 
reshape the post-Soviet neighborhood and integrate the 
CIS countries into the Eurasian Union.
The Regional Constraints of EU Policy
Recognizing the rich potential of the Caspian’s hydro-
carbon resources, the EU has deepened its relationships 
with the South Caucasus countries to access the energy 
deposits and decrease Europe’s dependence on Russian 
energy imports. In effect, the EU has concluded agree-
ments on transnational projects that will provide the flow 
of substantial energy supplies from Azerbaijan and the 
Caspian Sea region to the EU. Since the launch of the ENP, 
however, the EU’s engagement with the South Caucasus 
has frequently been criticized as ineffective.3 The sign-
ing of Action Plans and the negotiations over Association 
Agreements certainly helped advance the EU’s economic 
interests in the region, yet the EU could not act coher-
ently as a single state actor in developing a strategic plan 
for the South Caucasus. This failure has limited the EU’s 
influence and enabled Russia, via skillful diplomacy, to 
consolidate its geopolitical standing in the neighborhood. 
To put it simply, Moscow immediately filled the vacuum 
left by Brussels. 
The EU’s individual member states have thus far lacked 
cohesion in pursuing their rights, interests, and values 
in the region, while the EU’s overall strategy has obvi-
ously been dominated mainly by considerations of how 
European policies will affect relations between Brus-
sels and Moscow. This means that the EU is reluctant to 
stand up to Russia either geopolitically or geoeconomi-
cally. Though we should acknowledge the vital role the 
EU has played in bringing the South Caucasus closer to a 
wider EU-centered order of democracy, integration, and 
prosperity, the EU has at the same time refused to be a 
relevant security actor; Brussels primarily seeks to defuse 
tensions with Moscow, which has always been suspicious 
of Western encroachments. As a result, the EU and Russia 
have been ill-equipped to move beyond a sort of geopoliti-
cal zero sum game in which one side loses what the other 
one wins. This has ultimately harmed the interests of the 
South Caucasus countries more than it has helped them.
Divergent Responses from Armenia,  
Azerbaijan, and Georgia
The countries of the South Caucasus are increasingly 
vulnerable in the face of strained EU-Russian strate-
gic relations, to say nothing of geopolitical tensions in 
international affairs. Local decision makers seem to 
understand that neither Russia nor the EU has a real 
desire to pursue cooperative policies in the neighborhood 
they share. The realization that Russia and the EU had 
chosen competition over cooperation in the Caspian basin 
brought difficult times for regional leaders. Hence each of 
them announced their respective choices at the decisive 
moment.
Armenia clearly withdrew from its negotiations with 
the EU, turning instead toward Russia. The move was eas-
ily predictable from the outset because Yerevan has long 
been seen as Moscow’s traditional ally and has always 
relied entirely on Russian military and security assis-
tance. For its part, Azerbaijan’s non-membership in the 
World Trade Organization makes the country ineligible 
for a Deep and Comprehensive Free Trade Agreement 
(DCFTA). Baku has remained reluctant to commit itself to 
the path of EU integration and has instead narrowed its 
focus to visa-free travel and energy relations. Azerbaijan’s 
choice to eschew EU integration, however, is likely to 
involve a perilous balancing act, one that strives to allow 
Baku to remain outside the Eurasian Union while manipu-
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lating EU energy interests in the region. Georgia, the only 
country with a decidedly pro-EU government, formally 
signed its Association Agreement with the EU, along with 
its DCFTA, in Brussels on June 27, 2014. At the same time, 
Tbilisi has eagerly rushed to mend relations with Rus-
sia, its largest neighbor in the region. The EU seems to be 
unconcerned by Georgia’s new pro-Russian course, which 
suggests that this rethinking of Tbilisi’s policy has most 
likely been approved by Brussels. Despite this, Georgia’s 
Russian dream of improving political, economic, and cul-
tural ties with Moscow remains largely unfulfilled.
The different choices made by the three countries 
indicate the diversity of their geopolitical ambitions in 
terms of expanding their relations with the EU. Presum-
ably, the EU’s own integration strategies for its Eastern 
neighbors simply do not work without clear membership 
incentives for them. Brussels should find new ways of 
devising a more realistic, coherent, and articulated policy 
so as to better fit into the modern geopolitics of the South 
Caucasus. The Ukraine crisis has broken the status quo 
in the Eastern neighborhood, and the repercussions are 
now being felt. The final chapter of the post-Soviet states 
is therefore still being written, and there is much work to 
do before long-term stability and lasting peace become 
firmly rooted in the South Caucasus.
Looking Ahead: Prospects and Challenges
Given the continuing EU-Russian rivalry over alterna-
tive energy projects, no one can accurately predict the 
outcome of the current zero sum game being pursued in 
the Caspian basin. However, the process of reshaping the 
region can take different forms. Increased competition for 
energy resources is the most likely scenario and currently 
looks inevitable, as EU member states strive to reduce 
their deep dependency on Russian gas. Intense geopoliti-
cal competition may widen the gap between Brussels and 
Moscow. For the South Caucasus countries, this scenario 
means that they will increasingly be caught between 
Russia and the EU, trying to find a way to meet the needs 
of both and to avoid becoming a battleground between 
the two. It is a known fact that Russia and the EU are now 
fighting over regional security issues instead of deciding 
them together. 
Even so, there may also be a cooperation scenario, 
albeit one that looks less realistic; it is still possible for 
Moscow and Brussels to demonstrate political will and 
engage in increased dialogue. Economic incentives, trade 
interests, and joint responses to new security challenges 
could push both sides to think strategically about recon-
ciling two integration projects in their shared neighbor-
hood. Reconciliation would not be a simple process – but 
it is essential not only to Russia and the EU but also to 
the future of the post-Soviet countries and the rest of the 
world. Yet Brussels and Moscow need to develop an eco-
nomic and political basis for reconciliation. This can only 
take place through a constructive interaction between the 
EU and the Eurasian Union.
From an economic perspective, the EU could benefit 
greatly from starting a dialogue on a free-trade zone 
with the Eurasian Economic Union. Such a special, free 
economic zone would certainly not resolve all of the 
region’s security problems, but it could induce Russia and 
the EU to pursue cooperative engagement and strengthen 
economic integration with Armenia, Azerbaijan, and 
Georgia. Moreover, the EU needs to formulate an inte-
grated energy policy on the basis of a new comprehensive 
vision. The creation of a new format for multilateral 
dialogue between the EU and the five Caspian littoral 
states (Russia, Azerbaijan, Iran, Turkmenistan, and Ka-
zakhstan) will probably make it possible to find common 
ground and to remove differences on important strategic 
issues in relation to laying the Trans-Caspian Pipeline 
across the bottom of the Caspian Sea. The establishment 
of an EU-Caspian multilateral energy framework in which 
Russia’s participation is crucial could be a starting point 
for decreasing competition over resources in post-Soviet 
Eurasia.
From a political perspective, reconciliation between 
Russia and the EU could be developed through the elabo-
ration of a new, efficient, and overarching cooperative se-
curity model based on relations of genuine and profound 
partnership. Moscow and Brussels should explore new 
and complementary forms for managing regional crises. 
This would help them take fairly bold action to rectify the 
current security situation in the South Caucasus. Much 
has to do with consolidating the diplomacy of the OSCE 
Minsk Group even further by giving it a stronger politi-
cal element. This might be done by recreating the Minsk 
Group with the proactive participation of Russia, the EU, 
and the US.
Conclusion
Obviously, the security of Russia and the EU cannot be 
guaranteed if both are isolated from each other. Thought-
ful statesmen in both Moscow and Brussels need not 
relearn the painful lesson that isolationism is the road to 
disaster. Although the voices of division remain strong, 
the new security environment facing both Russia and the 
EU is so varied and challenging that only continued dia-
logue will help them find responses. But those challenges 
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can indeed be transformed into opportunities if Russia 
and the EU take responsibility and decisive action.
The EU, Russia, and the countries of the South Cau-
casus are entering a period that is likely to bring even 
greater change than in the past twenty years. There are 
urgent demands for new ways of cooperating on the 
problems that lurk on the horizon. The greatest chal-
lenge Russia and the EU must respond to in their shared 
neighborhood will be to design and implement a concrete 
peace plan for the South Caucasus. Solving the problem 
of how the region should be reshaped requires sustained 
commitment; this belongs at the top of the to-do lists of 
Russian and European leaders. For this to occur, however 
– and if Moscow wishes to be better placed to manage the 
peace process effectively – Russia needs especially to re-
think its overall strategy. For its part, the EU needs to give 
its Neighborhood Policy a more individualized tactical 
consideration based on a concerted approach by all the 
Union’s member states.
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